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The focus of this paper is on the rural poor of south Asia and their struggle to cope with the 
seasonal risk of unemployment and the ensuing income risks. In the absence of formal credit 
or insurance markets the rural poor typically resort to, among other options, the following 
informal strategies to cope with seasonal income risks: (i) seasonal rural-to-urban migration, 
and (ii) mutual (ex-post) transfers between families of friends and relatives. Access to credit 
through a microfinance institution could also provide a competing source of insurance. The 
question raised in this paper is how the access to credit may affect the more traditional/time 
honoured means of risk coping, such as seasonal migration. Given that credit, i.e., a credit-
financed activity, is potentially a substitute for seasonal migration, it is reasonable to argue 
that easy access to credit (or high return on credit) will lower the incidence of migration. 
However, there also exists a potential complementarity between the two activities (if 
implemented jointly) in terms of gains due to diversification of income risks. That is, given 
that income from migration is not typically subject to the same shocks as income generated by 
a credit-financed activity, a joint adoption of both activities creates opportunities for 
diversification of risk in the family incomes portfolio. If the diversification gains are large 
enough then the adoption of both activities jointly will be preferred to adopting either of the 
activities individually. In that event, introduction of microfinance in rural societies may result 
in raising the incidence of migration.  
 
The joint adoption case for rural households is modelled using a choice theoretic framework, 
and exact conditions are derived for when joint adoption is preferable to adoption of a single 
project. The model of joint adoption is estimated by applying a Bivariate Probit regression 
model on a single cross-section of household survey data from rural Bangladesh. Our 
preliminary results show that indeed the probability of participation in migration by 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The primary focus of this paper is on the rural poor of south Asia – mainly the landless or 
near landless peasant households – and their struggle to cope with the seasonal 
employment/income risks. The income risk has its origin in the following. Working members 
of peasant households typically face the risk of partial/full unemployment during the 
agricultural slack season due to low levels of activity/labour demand, and from this follows 
seasonal income risks. The associated consumption risks call for seasonal consumption 
smoothing or insurance. In the absence of either formal credit or insurance markets, these 
households typically resort to various informal (self-insurance) strategies. An obvious self-
insurance strategy is to build up savings during the peak seasons which are to be drawn down 
in the slack seasons if/when income falls short of consumption needs. However, such 
intertemporal risk-pooling typically does not work well since incomes across seasons often 
tend to be correlated. Other strategies of consumption smoothing for the rural poor, as cited in 
the literature, are: 
 (i)  A mutual insurance scheme among members of the same family, or between families 
of relatives and friends, implemented through ex-post transfers, (see, for example, 
Rosensweig (1988)). 
(ii)  Diversification of household incomes portfolio – an ex-ante measure – via, among 
other means, participation in seasonal rural-to-urban (or rural-to-rural) migration, 
(see among others, Stark (1978) and Stark and Levhari (1982)).  
Participation in seasonal migration usually entails the following. A participating household 
sends some of its working members to seek informal urban jobs during the slack season while 
the remaining members pursue rural employment. Further, the migrant members are expected 
to return home to participate in the peak season labour market. This allows for diversification 
of slack income to the extent that the incomes from rural and urban sources are not fully 
correlated.  
 
Ex-post transfers between relatives are a widely practiced custom in south Asia, but for it to 
function as an insurance provider, the parties/families involved in the exchange must have 
incomes that do not co-vary. This essentially requires that the parties either live far apart, or 
have highly different sources of income, (see Stark and Rosensweig (1989)). Among the 
alternative ex-ante diversification measures, evidence in the literature indicate that seasonal 
migration is by and large the preferred instruments of income diversification among the very   2
poor, (see, for example (Rogally (2002)). Seasonal migration owes its popularity to its 
relatively low financing costs/capital requirement compared to alternatives such as the various 
self-employment projects, e.g., petty trading, fish culture, poultry rearing, and the like, (which 
typically have higher start-up costs). However, the recent introduction of collateral-free credit 
for the rural poor via the various microfinance institutions could provide the means of 
financing the alternative self-employment projects mentioned above. Microfinance 
institutions thus create an opportunity for the diversification of family incomes portfolio, and 
hence an alternative/competing source risk-coping, i.e., an alternative to seasonal migration. 
The question raised in this paper is how the proliferation of micro-credit institutions affects 
the more traditional means of risk-coping, namely, seasonal migration. 
 
Micro-credit institutions typically target poor/landless households by offering them group-
based credit for small–scale “rural investment activities”. Given that a credit-financed activity 
is a potential substitute for seasonal migration, it is reasonable to argue that easy access to 
credit will lower the incidence of migration. However, there also exists a potential 
complementarity between rural investment and migration (if the two activities are 
implemented jointly by the same household) in terms of gains due to additional diversification 
of income risks. That is, given that incomes generated by migration (- urban sources -) and 
rural investment financed by micro-credit (- rural sources -) are not likely to be subject to 
common shocks, a joint adoption of both activities creates opportunities for diversification of 
risk in the family incomes portfolio. If the diversification gains are large enough then the joint 
adoption will be the preferred to adopting either of the activities individually. This gives rise 
to the possibility that the spread of microfinance in rural societies may indeed lead to a 
higher incidence of migration, and vice versa, (that is, the probability of participation in 
micro-credit also increases if the household has migrant workers in the family).   
 
The possibility that participation in migration may promote household adoption of risky 
investment was first suggested by Stark (1978) and Stark and Levhari (1982). We present 
below the Stark el al. argument it its appropriate context. A common feature of most 
developing economies, (especially of the rural sector), is that there exists an abundance of 
investment opportunities with high potential returns that are never exploited. The reason 
typically is that rural entrepreneurs lack access to formal capital markets, and in the absence 
of either capital or insurance markets, the entrepreneurs are simply unable to cope with 
subjective/perceived risks that investment activities entail. Given that the spreading of risks,   3
under these circumstances, would be the best way of reducing risk, an ideal strategy for a 
rural household would be 'a portfolio “investment” in urban earnings activity - namely, 
migration of a family member -' jointly with rural investment.
1 While Stark provides a   
mathematical proof of the claim – that migration is an “optimal” strategy –, (Stark (1978)), in 
our opinion, the analytical model he develops is highly general and lacks sufficient structures 
for it to yield meaningful testable hypotheses. Further, the basic proposition here, to the best 
of our knowledge, has not been modelled or studied elsewhere. This apparent oversight in the 
literature provides the main motivation for this paper. Additionally, we argue that both the 
“incidence of seasonal migration” as a behavioural phenomenon and “microfinance” as an 
antipoverty policy are two leading issues in poverty research. We believe that a study on the 
interaction between migration and microfinance will contribute to the understanding of the 
dynamics of rural poverty, and will have clear implications for poverty policies. In what 
follows, we develop a framework for analyzing both theoretically and empirically the joint 
investment phenomenon and explore its implications. We give below a brief summary of the 
modelling technique and the empirical methodology, followed by a plan for the rest of the 
paper.  
  
Using rural households as the decision making unit, the case of joint adoption is modelled in 
this paper utilizing an intertemporal, (albeit, a two-period), choice theoretic framework. 
Assuming that poor households perceive both migration and rural investment as risky 
activities, exact (marginal) conditions are derived for the case where joint adoption is 
preferable to adoption of a single activity. The empirical adaptation of the model is designed 
to capture the potential complementarity between the two activities in the joint adoption case. 
The methodology proposed here is a Bivariate Probit regression model. According to this, a 
test for complementarity would amount to testing if the probability that a household 
participates in seasonal migration increases in the event the household is also a recipient of 
micro-credit. Our preliminary estimation using a single cross-section of household survey 
data from rural Bangladesh lends clear support to the complementarity hypothesis. The rest of 
the essay is organized as follows. In section two, we model the investment decision of a 
representative farm family. We subsequently proceed to find a suitable empirical adaptation 
of the model, i.e., a regression model that captures the testable implications embedded in the 
theoretical analysis. In section three, the data and the empirical methodology are presented. 
                                                 
1 The quote comes from Stark and Levhari (1982), page ??   4
This is followed by the discussion of results. Section four contains the concluding remarks 
and caveats.  
 
2. The Model 
We consider a representative peasant household that owns virtually no assets other than its 
labour power
2.The prevailing agricultural labour market is seasonal, meaning that the labour 
market is tight during the peak season – (peak season is defined as the duration of harvesting 
and harvest related activities and planting/replanting of new crop) - followed by a period of 
relative inactivity, (called the slack- or off-season), during which demand for labour is 
particularly low. A typical household will earn its livelihood primarily through selling its 
labour power during the peak season. Additional income could be earned through pursuing 
various odd jobs during the slack season. Labour income from the peak season alone will 
normally fall far short of the minimum consumption needs of a farm household over the 
length of a crop cycle. The high incidence of off-season joblessness is therefore a main 
contributing factor to rural poverty. There exists however a wide range of potential 
investment/self-employment opportunities during the off-season that a poor household could 
engage in. For example, household members could become off-season traders (engaging in 
petty trading in the local market), or pursue home entrepreneurship, such as poultry farming, 
livestock rearing and the like. These activities will require moderate amount of start-up 
capital, and returns are risky. In the absence of micro-credit institutions, few peasant 
households will have access to alternative capital and/or have the ability to bear risk in order 
to make adoption of such investments worthwhile. To summarize the above, the problem 
facing a farm household contemplating rural investment/innovation is twofold: access to 
capital and managing (coping with) the risk. While the introduction micro-credit may mitigate 
the first of the problems, this does not necessarily resolve the issue of risk. Below, we propose 
to model the claim that farm households may resolve the issue of risk by adopting a scheme of 
joint undertaking, namely, participation in migration and rural investment funded through 
micro-credit. For concreteness, we assume that farm households have a two-period decision 
horizon: a peak season followed by a slack season. All (working) members of the household 
will seek work as agricultural labourers in the peak season. In the slack season, some 
household members will contemplate (seasonal) migration, while the remaining members will 
                                                 
2 The very poor in south Asia are often defined as those belonging to households that are functionally landless. 
That is, these households own their homestead land but not sufficient land for cultivation. We could assume, 
with no loss of generality, that our representative household is functionally landless.    5
become entrepreneurs. The model is developed in three stages. We develop first a benchmark 
scenario where households do not engage in either migration or rural investment
3. The model 
is extended by considering first the possibility of only rural investment. Here, we will derive 
the marginal conditions (in terms of minimum required rate of return) such that undertaking 
rural investment is worthwhile. We introduce finally the possibility for off-season migration 
jointly with rural investment.  
 
2.1. The benchmark 
Recall from above that our representative household is assumed to have a two period/season 
decision horizon. For simplicity, the benchmark case abstracts from uncertainty. All 
household members sell their labour effort in the peak season to earn a constant sum, W. 
Additionally, the household pursues all available odd/casual employment in the local area 
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The household utility function is defined as separable over the two periods and is a function 
of consumption in each period. The following maximization problem is solved:  
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The following first order condition is obtained:    
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3 The terms entrepreneurship, off-season investment and rural innovation are used interchangeably from here 
onward.   6
Here,  1 u  and  2 u  are utilities for peak and slack seasons respectively, and δ is defined as the 
time rate of discount (or, the rate of impatience).  
 
For purposes of illustration, we solve explicitly for c1 and c2 by assuming that farm 
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If  1 c  and  2 c  are stochastic, then φ (a positive constant) is defined as the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion. Applying the above first order condition on these utility functions, and 
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We define 
* U as the maximized utility for the benchmark case. This solution has an easy 
interpretation. Since future utility is discounted, the optimal allocation of consumption 
between the two periods is uneven: higher consumption is allocated to the first period, (note 
that  δ log  is negative). We introduce now risk in the model by allowing the household to 
contemplate investment activities (in the off-season) with uncertain returns. For the purpose 
of illustration, we assume that the household obtains a loan from the local micro-credit 
institution and (say) opens up a “poultry farm” in the homestead. The scale of undertaking 
(i.e., the size of farm) is not a decision variable in the model. It is thought to be just large 
enough to fully employ all (working) family members in the slack period. The latter 
assumption imply that the loan-size is flexible, that is, the household can take up as much loan 
as necessary to achieve the desired farm-size
4. Below, we proceed to derive the 
critical/marginal conditions in terms of the required minimum rate of return on 
                                                 
4 This assumption is certainly not in conformity with the normal lending practice of micro-credit institutions. 
Loans under these schemes are rationed – only a small, fixed-size loan is given to the first time borrowers. Our 
model is meant to be largely illustrative and not intended to capture the exact mechanics of the banking practice 
of these institutions.   7
entrepreneurship (“poultry-farming”) that leaves the household indifferent between adopting 
and not adopting off-season entrepreneurship.      
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That is, the net return on investment is defined to be stochastic (risky) and the (additive) risk 
term is normally distributed with zero mean and a constant variance. Assuming that the 
household maximizes expected utility in the face of uncertainly, following expression for 
expected utility is obtained: 
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where  CE c2 is the “certainty equivalent” consumption for the slack season. (Note that the 
decisions are made in the peak/first period). Further, with the assumption of negative 
exponential utility, we obtain:    
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The maximization problem is given as follows: 
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The constraint implies that the total household utility in the event that investment in 
entrepreneurship is made must be at least as large as the utility under the benchmark case. 
Assuming that the constraint holds with equality, it follows trivially that the optimal   8
consumption allocation for the above problem, ( CE c c 2 1 ˆ   , ˆ ), is identical to that for the 
benchmark case. That is,  
*
2 2 ˆ     and     *
1 1 ˆ c CE c c c = = . 
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Equation (2) has the following interpretation. For entrepreneurship to be worthwhile, the 
expected net total return from this ( 1 µ ) must exceed the slack season income, F, (under the 
benchmark scenario), by at least 
2
1 2
1φσ , that is, the relevant risk premium. We define this 
required minimum rate of return as the critical rate of return on entrepreneurship,  E CR : 
2
1 2
1φσ + = F CRE  
We introduce now the possibility of an addition slack season investment opportunity, namely, 
participation in seasonal/temporary migration.  Our aim is to show that the critical rate of 
return on joint investment (defined as  JI CR ) (i.e., the required minimum rate of return that 
makes joint investment worthwhile) is lower than the corresponding critical rate of return on 
entrepreneurship,  E CR . This will make joint investment a more likely outcome than a single 
investment (i.e., entrepreneurship).  
 
2.3. The case of joint investment  
 
The entire household is assumed to participate in the peak season labour market, just as 
before. In the slack season, the household has the option of dividing up the total family labour 
between migration activities and rural entrepreneurship. Slack season migration takes the 
form of family members travelling to urban centres to seek casual employment, and returning 
home before the peak season labour market opens up. Recall that  1
~
R is defined as the net 
return from entrepreneurship when all family members participate in this activity. We assume 
here that net return varies linearly with the proportion of total family labour that participates,   9
that is, if a proportion α  of family labour participates then net return (on entrepreneurship) 
will be 1
~
  R α
5. Net return from migration,  2
~
) 1 ( R α − , is the wage income of the remaining 
family members (as migrants) net of all migration costs. (Note that  2
~
R  denotes net migration 
income when all family members become off-season migrants). The above assumptions are 
summarized below. 
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The certainty equivalent consumption for the slack season is given by: 
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The problem the household faces here is a two-fold optimization problem: to allocate the 
available family labour between the two investments (the portfolio allocation decision) and to 
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The appropriate Lagrange function is given by: 
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5 This assumption essentially implies that there are no economies of scale in entrepreneurship. This is invoked 
for simplicity.    10
The first order conditions are given by: 
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Given that the constraint holds with equality, λ>0. The above first order conditions then give: 
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Note that the equation above is identical as (1). Then the optimal allocation of consumption in 
the present case will be identical as to that of the benchmark case (as well as the single 
investment case). Denoting the solution as (
* * * *
2
* *
1 , , α
CE c c ), and equating the slack season 
consumption in the benchmark case with the corresponding consumption in the joint 
investment case, we get,  
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Optimal investment rule in (4) has a straightforward interpretation. For the joint investment to 
be worthwhile, its expected return must exceed the alternative certain return, F, (i.e., the slack 
season income in the benchmark case) by an amount at least equal to the associated risk 
premium. The critical return on joint investment,  JI CR , is given by: 
                                      2
2
1         φσ + = F JI CR  
That is, if the expected rate of return on joint investment is higher than the critical rate,  JI CR , 
then the joint investment would be the preferred option. 
 
Note that the optimal solution for α, given by (3), does not depend on the intertemporal 
allocation of consumption. The solution to α comes out of the following:   11









c E CE c  
The above partial derivative further implies that α is chosen so as to minimize the portfolio 
variance (for a given rate of expected portfolio return). According to (3), the optimal 
proportion of family labour that is engaged in entrepreneurship will ceteris paribus vary 
positively with the rate of return differential between the two investments, ( 2 1 µ µ − ), 
positively with the variance of return from migration,  2
2 σ , and negatively with the variance of 
return on entrepreneurship,  2
2 σ . The relationship between α and the covariance term  12 σ  is 
ambiguous.  
 
2.4. How does rural innovation facilitate migration? 
In order to show why investment in entrepreneurship facilitates participation in migration, we 
compare the optimality conditions in (2) and (4). In order to make the two conditions 
comparable we first make the following assumptions: 
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Given the above, the portfolio variance or the variance of the joint return,
2 σ , will take on the 
following value: 
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The equation above shows that the portfolio variance under joint investment is half the 
variance of the individual investment. It follows that the risk premium under joint investment 
will also be half that of the individual investments. That is, 
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This is an illustration of what we call benefits from diversification. The above inequality 
along with equations (2) and (4) imply in turn that the critical rate of return in the joint 
investment case is lower than that of any of the two investments separately: 
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 If we assume instead that the covariance need not be zero, it can then be shown (by leaving 
the other assumptions unchanged) that the only instance where there is no diversification   12
benefit is where the correlation coefficient between the two returns is unity. To verify this, we 
look as the following definition: 
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σ = ⇒ = = ≡ R R .  
If we substitute  2 1 12   σ σ σ =  in the risk premium calculation above, we find that the risk 
premium for the joint project is equal to that for entrepreneurship. In that case, the household 
would be indifferent in terms of adoption decision between the joint investment and a single 
investment. 
 
The query we set off to investigate was if the family’s adoption of risky investment would 
facilitate participation in migration (by family members). The intuition is that given that 
income of migrants from urban sources (which is also risky) is likely to be uncorrelated with 
income generated from entrepreneurship (a rural activity), possibilities exist for gains from 
risk diversification when households engage in both activities simultaneously. In order to 
establish this intuition, we develop an illustrative model that draws on the theory of portfolio 
management. By treating off-season migration and entrepreneurship as competing investment 
projects, we produce an example where the household is better off by investing in both 
projects simultaneously, (i.e., forming a portfolio of the two projects), than investing in any 
one of the two projects alone. The reason simply is that the portfolio risk is lower than the 
individual project risk  (as shown in the example). 
 
(For readers: The paper requires substantial revision/rewriting from this point onward) 
 
2.5. Empirical implementation     
The main hypothesis we wish to test is to what extent a given household’s investment in risky 
activities may explain its propensity to participate in migration. That the decision to engage in 
rural entrepreneurship may promote migration within a given household is captured in 
equations (2) and (4). Equation (3) on the other hand captures the relative proportions of 
household labour that are allocated to the alternative investments. In fact, the relationship in 
(3) could be a useful point of departure in terms of forming an empirical model. Note that α** 
in (3) represents the optimal proportion of family labour employed in entrepreneurship. This 
could alternatively be viewed as the size of investment, since, by definition, α is proportional 
to the size of the undertaking. For the purpose of estimation, we give α yet another 
interpretation, namely, α could be viewed as the probability of investing in entrepreneurship.   13
It is reasonable to argue that factors that affect the size of investment will also affect the 
probability of adoption of that investment.  We reinterpret (3) as follows. 
 
The probability of investing in entrepreneurship (a proxy for α) is larger (with other things 
being the same) 
i)  larger is the expected return on entrepreneurship, µ1, (or smaller is the return 
to migration activities, µ2 ), 
ii)  smaller is the variance of own return,  2
1 σ  (or larger the variance of returns 
from migration,  2
2 σ ),  
and equivalently for the probability of participation in migration. 
 
Note that the specification above (following equation (3)) allows for only two risky 
investments in the household portfolio. The framework can be easily extended to include 
other investment objects for purposes of estimation. Further, we could allow these additional 
investments to be either substitutes or complements to investment in entrepreneurship. Note 
however that (3) does not capture the main hypothesis that we wish to test, namely that joint 
investment potentially reduces total portfolio variance, thus making both investments more 
viable. One way of incorporating this explicitly is to add the following (hypothesis) to the 
empirical model above: 
 
The probability of participation in migration is higher  
iii)  if the household also engages itself in rural investment. 
 




We apply a Bivariate Probit model to estimate the relationship spelled out above. The two 
household decision variables, participation in seasonal migration (Migrate) and loan-financed 
investment (Invest), are defined to have binary outcomes. Households either invest (Invest=1) 
or do not (Invest=0), and similarly for participation in migration, i.e., Migrate=1 or 
Migrate=0. The estimating model is specified as follows:   14
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The probability that the households engage in both entrepreneurship (Invest=1) and 
participates in migration (Migrate=1) is given by a bivariate normal distribution. The x’s are 
the explanatory variables proxying for the rates of return on the two investment projects and 
their variances/covariances, etc., as specified in equation (3). Equations (5) and (6) form the 
empirical counterpart to equation (3). Under the null hypothesis that ρ=0, the model above 
collapses to two univariate Probit model implying that the two investment decisions are 
independent. By implication, the alternative hypothesis, ρ>0, stands for the claim that two 
investment are complementary to each other. The model is estimated (as a standard method) 
by Maximum Likelihood technique using statistical package Stata, version 8. 
 
3. Data and choice of variables 
 
Our data set is based on a household survey conducted in 1994 in two groups of villages (each 
group belonging to a distinct region) in Bangladesh by the Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS), University of Sussex in England. The first group of villages are located in the 
Chandina thana of Comilla district and the second group of villages are from the Madhupur 
thana of Tangail district
6. The survey covered 5062 households of which 2495 were from 
Chandina. Note that the two regions represented here are geographically distinct (about 250 
kilometers apart) and have markedly different socio-economic characteristics. For the present 
purpose, we exclude from the sample two villages from Chandina that do not have any 
functioning credit program. This leaves us with a sample of 3422 households from six 
villages. Further discussion on data, summary statistics of data, etc. are omitted in the present 
(preliminary) version due to time constraint.  
 
The two binary decision variables (or) independent variables of the model are 
measured/proxied for the purpose of estimation as follows. 
                                                 
6 A thana is an administrative unit consisting of several villages. The word thana literally means “police station”.   15
Variable “Invest”, defined as rural investment undertaken by households using institutional 
credit, is proxied by    
 
⎩ ⎨ ⎧ = otherwise.    0,  
loan   nal institutio   an   taken   ever   had   household   the   if    1,   Invest  
 
Note that microfinance institutions advance loans to those families who are functionally 
landless (with some exceptions) and who have submitted loan applications with a viable 
investment project. The utilization of the loan is also closely monitored.  
 







otherwise.    0,  
migrant   permanent   a      
  or temporary    a   is    who member   one   least   at   has   household   the   if    1,  
Migrate  
 
The above definition of “Migrate” appears to violate the assumption (of the theoretical model) 
that our focus is exclusively on seasonal migration. That is, given that permanent migrants 
live and work away from home all year round, it is unlikely that they with repatriate much of 
their income/savings to their rural home. As such, the family income diversification function 
of migration will be lost. It would therefore be advisable that permanent migrants should not 
be included in the definition. However, the permanent migrants in our sample are 
qualitatively very similar to temporary/seasonal migrants in that majority have strong ties 
with their rural home, for example, most of the adult male (permanent) migrants have their 
wife and children living in the rural home.   
  
As to the choice of the main independent variables for the regression model, (namely, returns 




1   and   σ σ , the covariance,  12 σ ), 
we do not have direct measures for all of these. As such, we rely on a wide range of proxies 
that directly or indirectly represent (or influence) these variables. Some of these proxies are 
household-specific, others are region specific. We give below a list (as well as definition) of 
all the variables in the regression model. 
Independent variables are listed in Table 1 below.     16
Table 1 














Explanatory variables for 
both equations 
    
      
 HEADEDU (DUMMY)  
 
Education level of household head 
     = 1, if 10 years of school (secondary) or more 
     = 0, otherwise 
+/- +/- 
HEADSEX (DUMMY)  
 
Sex of household head =1, if female 




Access to irrigated land 
       =1, if household has access to irrigated land for 
             cultivation 





=1, if the household is from Chandina 
=0, if the household is from Modhupur  
+ + 








CROPLAND  Total amount of cropland owned  -  - 
FAMILYSIZE Total  family  members  +  + 
POND (DUMMY)  =1, if the household owns fish pond, 




Number of households in the compound  +/-  +/- 
 RELIGION  =1, if muslim household 
= 0, if hindu household 
-/+ - 
      
 
The rationale for the choice of the variables will be presented together with the regression 




Bivariate Probit regression                                         Figures in parentheses are Z-values 
Number of observations =1994                                  * indicates significance at 90% 
Wald χ
2(22) = 544.25                                                 ** indicates significance at 95% 
                                                                                    *** indicates significance at 99% 
      
Variables COEFFICIENT 
EQUATION:  Migrate 
 COEFFICIENT                      






































































      
Estimate of ρ (rho) = 0.116 
Likelihood-ratio test for ρ=0: 
  χ
2(1)=4.234,      Prob (χ
2(1) > 4.234) = 0.0396  
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3.1. Discussion of results 
 
Note that in line with theoretical model in equation (3), the list of explanatory variables in 
both of the Probit equations is identical. The list of included explanatory variables, at this 
stage, is quite short – we are still in the process of finding additional relevant variables – but 
care is taken in choosing variables that are fully exogenous/predetermined in order to avoid 
the problem of simultaneity, (i.e., endogenous variables on the right-hand side). Further, the 
results reported in Table 2 are obtained using a sample that excludes the poorest 25% and the 
richest 15% of the households. (The rational for this is not discussed in this version due to 
time constraint). Below we explain first the rationale for choice of variables along with the 
expected signs of the effects (i.e., the sign of coefficients) followed by discussions of the 
actual estimates.  
 
HEADEDU (DUMMY) 
A household with a well-educated/well-informed head is expected to be a better decision 
maker in terms of choice and execution of investment projects. Such a household is likely to 
have relatively lower perceived risks and/or higher expected returns and therefore more 
inclined to invest in entrepreneurship. However, an educated household head also imply a 
“resourceful” household. These households may simply not qualify for institutional loans. The 
relevant coefficient is insignificant which is in line with our prediction. 
 
An educated household head could also have a positive impact on migration, in that, he/she is 
likely to be better informed about alternative opportunities. However, in line with the 
argument above, these households are likely to have a well diversified incomes portfolio, and 
therefore are less likely to need additional diversification through migration.  The relevant 
coefficient is positive and significant.  
 
HEADSEX (DUMMY) 
The female household heads are typically widows or divorcees, - often older women - who 
are typically resource poor in terms of both assets/capital and labour, (that is, these 
households are less likely to have adult males). These households will also have difficulty in 
finding partners (i.e., forming groups) in order to apply for group-loans. While micro-credit   19
institutions are supposed to be especially supportive of poor female borrowers, a separate 
regression model with the same data set - results not reported here - reveals that probability of 
borrowing from micro-credit institutions is negatively affected by the fact that a given 
household has a female head.  A negative coefficient obtained in the present regression 
corroborates our earlier results.  
 
A female-headed household will also have difficulty to participate in migration because of 
high opportunity costs. Note that these households will almost certainly have no adult male – 
that is why these are called female-headed - where males are the typical migrants. The 
estimated coefficient is insignificant.   
 
CROPLAND  
Ownership of (large amount of) cropland is an important source of insurance against income 
shock in rural economies. Further, large land-owners are also expected to have other assets 
and hence a diversified incomes portfolio. On the other hand, these households, having large 
risk-bearing ability, may indeed wish to invest in (additional) rural entrepreneurship. However 
ownership of land will probably disqualify them from applying for institutional loans
7. The 
relevant coefficient is negative and significant in line with our prediction. 
 
The insurance function of land-ownership implies that participation in migration may not be a 
priority for these households. The relevant coefficient for the migration equation is negative 




This measures a household’s access to irrigated land. Note that access to irrigated land in 
Bangladesh allows farmers to grow crops in periods that are traditionally considered off-
season. Thus, this variable is thought to indicate the extent to which a household has access to 
off-season employment/income generating activities. Access to irrigated land is therefore a 
source of insurance against seasonal income risks. This is likely to lower the need for 
additional insurance via migration.  
 
                                                 
7 Our sample reveals that while the probability of receiving institutional credit declines with increasing 
landholding, large landholders are by no means excluded by the lenders.   20
The same argument also applies in the case of rural investment. The estimated coefficients for 




This (dummy) variable is constructed to capture regional differences in the probability of 
participation in either migration or rural investment (borrowing) that are not explained by the 
individual/family specific explanatory variables. The estimates show that belonging to 
Chandina region significantly raises the average probability of migration. This difference 
could be a measure for factors not captured explicitly in the model, such as climatic 
differences in the two regions (e.g., Chandina is more prone to seasonal flooding compared to 
Modhupur), or differences in economic infrastructure, e.g., transportation network, extent of 
electrification, etc. Chandina is at a relative disadvantage in terms of various economic 
infrastructure, and therefore, Chandina-households are in a greater need to participate in 
migration to achieve income diversification.  The estimated positive coefficient in the 
migration equation agrees with the above conjecture.  
 
In the investment equation, Chandina has a negatively significant coefficient reflecting the 
fact that microfinance activities are more widespread and have a much longer history in 
Modhupur compared to Chandina. 
 
MALES  
Large number of males in the household certainly facilitates entrepreneurship (investment). 
Working men – agricultural workers - generally have a low opportunity cost of time during 
the slack season and as such could be “profitably” employed in family businesses. However, 
having many male members will also increase the possibility of alternative income sources 
(and income diversification), and accordingly, discourage investment in entrepreneurship (as 
a source of diversification). Expected net effect is therefore ambiguous.  
 
As far as migration is concerned, a large number of male members can definitely facilitate 
participation in migration. The estimated coefficient for the investment equation is negatively 
significant whereas the same coefficient in migration equation is positive and strongly 
significant. These are in accord with our a priori intuition.  
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FEMALES 
Having many females over age 14, does not appear to be advantageous for entrepreneurship, a 
priori, since women in general do not participate in outdoor activities, such as petty trading. 
However, if investment activities are driven from within the home, then female members are a 
definite advantage. 
 
Many adult females in the family do not in general encourage migration, however, the recent 
proliferation of urban based garment industry (which exclusively employs young women) 
implies that variable “FEMALE” could indeed have a positive effect on the probability of 
migration. The results show that the variable has a positive and significant coefficient in the 
migration equation but an insignificant coefficient in the investment equation. 
 
RELIGION 
This represents the religious denomination of the household. There are two categories here: 
Hindu and Muslim. Being a member of the religious minority (just over 8% in this sample), 
the Hindu households are expected to have relatively stronger communal bonds (as opposed 
to their Muslim counterpart), that is, they are likely to form close networks of families and be 
highly supportive of each other. Indeed, being a member of the Hindu community in itself 
gives access to a source of insurance against income risks. Migration by a member of a Hindu 
family implies that the migrating individual loses the protection and support of the (rural) 
community network, which simply increases the opportunity cost of migration. This may 
discourage migration. 
 
In terms of  participation in borrowing, being a member of the Hindu community could 
indeed be an advantage in that it would be easier to form groups (in order to seek group 
credit) from within the family network. While the coefficient in migration equation is strongly 
negative the same for the investment equation is insignificant.   
 
POND (DUMMY) 
Ownership of pond could be complementary to rural entrepreneurship in that it facilitates 
investment fish farming. However a pond-owner is not likely to be a landless poor and may 
therefore not qualify for institutional credit.  
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As to the migration equation, potential income from pond (through fish farming, etc.) 
provides income diversification and may therefore dampen the need for migration. One may 
on the other hand argue that pond ownership (fish farming) is complementary to migration in 
terms of gains from diversification. This could encourage migration (i.e., if the latter effect is 
dominant). The estimated coefficient for POND is negative (and significant) in the investment 
equation, and insignificant for the migration equation. 
 
FAMILY SIZE 
The argument that there is a strong insurance motive for having large families among poor 
rural households could well be applied in the present case. Large families imply larger 
number of working members in the household. This could provide some insurance against 
low season income risk if two or more family members choose to pursue alternative 
employment/income opportunities (with less than fully correlated risks). Large families may, 
on the other hand, imply lower opportunity cost of migration, and therefore encourage 
migration.  
 
Having a large family may also facilitate adoption of investment projects, in that large 
families will enjoy a cost advantage in running/operating such undertaking. The estimated 
coefficient is positive and significant in the investment equation, but the comparable 
coefficient in the migration equation is insignificant. 
 
NO_H 
This variable stands for the number of houses/families that share a compound. The families 
within a compound will typically have close ties, and therefore belonging to a large 
compound is itself a source of insurance. Belonging to a large network of families may 
facilitate securing a loan and thus encourage rural investment. It can also encourage migration 
by lowering its opportunity costs.  The estimated coefficient is insignificant in the migration 
equation but negatively significant in the investment equation.  
 
The complementarity hypothesis (ρ=0 vs. ρ>0) 
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 95% level in favour of the alternative hypothesis that 
ρ>0. This implies that there are unobserved factors (i.e., factors not included in the list of 
explanatory variables) that lie behind the positive correlation between the two decision 
variables. This in consistent with our complementarity hypothesis.     23
 
4. Some concluding remarks 
The results, on the whole, appear to lend strong support to our main hypothesis that 
participation in borrowing (risky investment) facilitates participation in migration via benefits 
from risk diversification. However, we find that the complementarity hypothesis is supported 
in the data only if we exclude the poorest 25% (those earning under $100 per capita) from the 
sample. This may be indicative of the fact that the very poor are unable to exploit the gains 
from diversification in the same manner as their relatively better off counterparts. 
(INCOMPLETE).   
(This part is to be expanded to include additional discussion of results and policy 
recommendations).      24
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